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Few would dispute that the security of property and contractual rights and the 
efficiency with which governments manage the provision of public goods and the creation 
of government policies, are significant determinants of the speed with which countries 
grow.  North (1990, p. 54) asserts, for example, that "the inability of societies to develop 
effective, low-cost enforcement of contracts is the most important source of both 
historical stagnation and contemporary underdevelopment in the Third World. . ." 
because the absence of secure property and contractual rights discourages investment and 
specialization.
2
  Conditional convergence in per capita incomes across nations, the object 
of an already large theoretical and empirical literature, is one natural platform for testing 
the importance of property rights to growth.  This literature predicts that the lower the 
level of steady state income of countries, the slower is their rate of convergence to the 
steady state from a given initial level of income (see Barro and Sala i Martin (1992)).  In 
countries with unprotected property rights, the steady state level of income to which they 
can aspire should be lower.  Countries that make inefficient public investment and 
economic policy decisions would also be expected to have lower steady state levels of 
income.   
Nevertheless, principally because of data limitations, empirical research into 
cross-country sources of growth and convergence has been restricted to a narrow 
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examination of the role of institutions.  This has hindered the development of a robust, 
cross-country test of North's proposition.  Lacking data that directly bears on the security 
of property rights or on the institutions that protect property rights, researchers have relied 
upon measures of political stability (Barro (1991)), such as coups and revolutions and 
political assassinations, or on the Gastil (1983, 1986) measures of political freedoms and 
civil liberties (Kormendi and Meguire (1985), Grier and Tullock (1989).   Scully (1988), 
McMillan, Rausser and Johnson (1991)).  These sets of variables capture only 
incompletely many of the relevant threats to property and contractual rights.
3
   
In addition, recent contributions to the growth literature have incorporated stylized 
notions of property rights and rent-seeking into formal growth models (see Tornell and 
Velasco (1993) and Rama (1993)).  Rama models the relationship between rent-seeking 
and economic growth.  His tests of the model, using data on rent-seeking legislation from 
Uruguay, suggest an association between rent-seeking and low growth.  Empirical work 
in this area has not yet employed direct measures of the security of property rights, 
however.   
This paper compares more direct measures of the institutional environment with 
both the instability proxies used by Barro (1991) and the Gastil indices, by comparing 
their effects both on growth and private investment.  The results provide substantial 
support for the position that the institutional roots of growth and convergence are 
significant.  The marked improvement that these new variables represent over existing 
proxies also suggests that there are substantial returns to future research into variables 
that reflect the security of property rights and the efficiency with which states determine 
economic policies and allocate public goods.   
Ambiguities of Political Violence and the Gastil Indices 
Political instability in previous studies is typically captured by two variables 
measuring political violence:  revolutions and coups, and assassinations.  Barro (1991) 
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employed averages of these measures over the 1960-85 period, to match the period for 
which growth data was then available from Summers and Heston (1991).  In the present 
analysis, two different time periods are employed for revolutions and coups, in the 
variables REVC6088 and REVC7488.  Both measure the average number of coups and 
revolutions per year, each over a different period.  Two other variables measure the 
average number of assassinations per year per million population over two different 
periods, ASSN6088 and ASSN7488.   
There are two seven-point Gastil indices, one for civil liberties and the other for 
political freedom.  Both are averages for the periods 1973-1986.  Since the two indices 
are highly correlated with each other (the correlation coefficient is .97), they are added 
together to form the variable FREE7386, which ranges from two to fourteen.  Higher 
values of all of these variables indicate fewer freedoms or greater political violence and, 
therefore, worsening conditions for investment.   
The logic behind the use of political instability variables such as revolutions, 
coups and political assassinations is straightforward.  Leaders who fear replacement are 
more likely to expropriate because they expect to bear fewer of the future costs of their 
current expropriatory actions [see chapters 5 and 6].  Moreover, during periods of 
political instability, particularly when instability is triggered by non-constitutional events, 
institutional and non-institutional mechanisms for protecting property and contractual 
rights are more fragile, and entrepreneurs are likely to reduce and to reallocate investment 
to avoid risk.   
There are several reasons why such a variable only partially reflects the variation 
in property rights security among countries.  First, leaders are averse to losing power 
whether or not their replacement is unconstitutional.  However, the variables representing 
political instability contemplate only non-constitutional political events, revolutions, 
coups and assassinations.  The actions of those leaders who face a higher risk of losing 
power constitutionally are not captured by this variable.  Therefore, the success of this 
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variable as a proxy for the effects of leadership tenure on property rights depends on 
whether short leadership tenure is correlated with expectations of unconstitutional 
replacement.  There is little evidence on this point.   
Second, the proxy itself may be misleading.  Countries may experience few coups 
and revolutions but nevertheless exhibit insecure property rights.  In fact, dictators who 
are most effective in the repression of dissent may be the most successful in avoiding 
coups, revolutions and assassinations, but offer the worst protection for property rights.  
Malawi and Zambia, for example, exhibit very low frequencies of coups and revolutions; 
the leaders of these two countries survived or have survived in office for exceptionally 
long periods of time.  Few would argue, however, that the absence of political violence 
endows these countries with more secure property rights than France, Italy and even 
Germany, all of which score at least as poorly on the measures of political violence 
employed by Barro (1991).  On the other hand, the victors in countries with frequent 
coups often do not make significant policy changes.  Property rights that were vulnerable 
before a particular coup are likely to continue to be vulnerable.  In these countries, 
political upheaval is likely to be symptomatic of an institutional environment that fails to 
protect property rights, just as it fails to ensure orderly political transitions.  The new 
variables measure the inadequacies of the institutional environment directly, rather than 
through the proxies of the political violence variables.   
The third limitation of the political violence indicators is that there are many 
margins on which institutions can affect property rights; instability is a relatively crude 
indicator of these, detracting from its usefulness for deriving policy prescriptions.  Fourth, 
Londregan and Poole (1990) and others have shown, as Barro (1991) acknowledges, that 
political violence is in turn very sensitive to economic performance.
4
  This sensitivity 
introduces problems of simultaneity into estimates of the effects of political violence on 
growth and investment.   
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For their part, the Gastil indices are aggregate measures that have been compiled 
without the explicit aim of measuring the security of property rights.  Although they 
embody some consideration of the security of private property, they contain multiple and 
diverse other dimensions, including freedom of religion and rights of worker association.  
For many purposes these variables are of great importance.  However, many of the 
dimensions are not closely related to property rights.  Moreover, since the indices are not 
disaggregated and the implicit weights attached to the various dimensions may vary over 
time and between countries, these measures are likely to embody considerable 
measurement error in evaluating the particular institutions thought to affect property 
rights, contracting rights, and the efficiency with which public goods are allocated.
5
   
The institutional data 
The focus of this paper is on institutional indicators compiled by two private 
international investment risk services:  International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) and 
Business Environmental Risk Intelligence (BERI).  We use the first observations that 
these services have for any country.  For BERI, the vast majority of observations are from 
1972 and for ICRG, nearly all observations are from 1982.  Unlike the Gastil data, these 
two sources provide detailed ratings for large samples on disaggregated dimensions of 
property rights that are closely related to those institutions emphasized by North (1990), 
Weingast (1993), Olson (1982) and others.
6
    
ICRG variables Expropriation Risk, measuring the risk of expropriation, and Rule 
of Law, measuring whether there are established peaceful mechanisms for adjudicating 
disputes, are interpreted here as proxies for the security of property and contract rights.
7
  
If countries score low on these dimensions, they are likely to suffer a reduction in the 
quantity and efficiency of investment in physical and human capital.  As the probability 
increases that investors will lose the proceeds from the investment, or the investment 
itself, investors reduce their investment and channel their resources to activities that are 
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more secure from the threat of expropriation (trading rather than manufacturing, for 
example), although they may be less profitable.   
Repudiation of Contracts by Government is another indicator of contract 
enforcement.  It is likely that if private actors cannot count on the government to respect 
the contracts it has with them, they will also not be able to count on the government 
enforcing contracts between private parties.  Without impartial enforcement of contracts 
by the state, only "self-enforcing" exchanges between private economic actors will occur-
-those in which the benefits of compliance exceed the gains from cheating or reneging.  
This restriction on economic activity severely limits the universe of possible Pareto-
improving exchanges that would otherwise be undertaken.   
Repudiation also measures government credibility.  Regimes in which officials 
have the power unilaterally to modify or to repudiate contractual agreements will likely 
be unconstrained in other ways.  In particular, entrepreneurs are likely to be suspicious 
about the institutional or other barriers on state officials that keep them from pursuing 
policies of confiscatory taxation (directly, or through inflation), or outright 
expropriation.
8
  
The remaining two ICRG variables used in this paper are Corruption in 
Government and Quality of Bureaucracy.  They are taken as proxies for the general 
efficiency with which government services are provided, and for the extent and damage 
of rent-seeking behavior.  When countries score poorly (low) on these dimensions, it is a 
strong indication that a bureaucracy lacks procedural clarity or technical competence and 
is likely to introduce criteria other than efficiency into the determination of government 
policies or the allocation of public goods.  In particular, the bureaucracy is likely to award 
contracts, business and trade licenses, police protection and so forth on the basis of 
criteria other than those of allocative and technical efficiency.   In addition, bureaucracies 
where corruption is high or competence is low are less likely to provide a strong bulwark 
against infringements on property rights.  The resulting distortions in investment and 
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trade may reduce the quantity and efficiency of capital investment and foreign technology 
introduced into the country.   
Theoretically, the use of corrupt allocation schemes in the political marketplace 
need not produce less efficient results than other forms of political allocation.  However, 
in those countries where ICRG records high levels of corruption, entrepreneurs are also 
beset by greater uncertainty regarding the credibility of government commitments.  That 
is, the same institutions that allow public officials to demand large and arbitrary bribes, 
such as failed law enforcement systems, also inhibit those officials from credibly 
pledging not to renege on their future commitments.  This discourages investment and 
encourages forms of economic activity that are less vulnerable to expropriation.
9
   
  The measures from BERI that are used for this paper are Contract Enforceability 
and Infrastructure Quality, Nationalization Potential and Bureaucratic Delays.  The 
latter two parallel, respectively, the ICRG variables Expropriation Risk and Quality of 
Bureaucracy.  The relevance of all the BERI variables is indicated by the foregoing 
discussion, with the exception of Infrastructure Quality.  This variable allows some 
approximation to be made to the efficiency with which governments allocate public 
goods.
10
   
Because of strong correlations among these separate indicators, with the 
consequent risk of multicollinearity, and in order to avoid omitting any of them from the 
equation, the five ICRG variables and the four BERI variables have been aggregated to 
form an ICRG index (ICRG82) and a BERI index (BERI72) of the security of contractual 
and property rights.  Although the aggregation is accomplished through simple addition, 
the results reported below do not change significantly when individual components of 
these indices are used, or when the indices are compiled with different weights.
11
  Higher 
values of the ICRG and BERI indices indicate better conditions for investment.   
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Comparing Institutional Variables, Violence and the Gastil Indices 
The importance of institutional data that more precisely represents the security of 
property and contractual rights on growth is evaluated in a number of ways.  First, we run 
correlations between the institutional variables and the political violence and Gastil 
indices.  Second, we assess the relative explanatory power of the various measures in 
empirical growth equations.  Third, we compare the coefficient on initial income with and 
without the institutional variables.  If countries converge to their steady state incomes, 
and if institutions are significant determinants of the steady state incomes to which 
countries converge, then the coefficient on initial income should be higher when 
institutions are adequately controlled for.  That is, if the convergence hypothesis is correct 
we should find that countries grow faster, the lower their initial income, if we control 
sufficiently for the quality of their institutions.  Fourth, we compare the power of the 
variables in explaining private investment rates across countries.   
Low correlations between the data are an indication that the institutional variables 
from the investor services contain information not in the other variables.  High 
correlations suggest, on the other hand, that the new variables may add little additional 
information.  The correlations below are negative, because higher values of the political 
violence and Gastil variables indicate worsening conditions for investment, while higher 
values of the ICRG and BERI indices indicate better conditions for investment.    
In fact, the correlations are relatively low, as Table One indicates. The ICRG 
index for 1982 has a Pearson correlation coefficient of only -0.23 with ASSN7488 and -
0.42 with REVC7488.  The Pearson correlation with FREE7386 is higher, at -0.66.  
Correlations with the political instability variables rise somewhat for the longer period, 
1960-88, to -0.27 for ASSN6088 and  -.51 for REVC6088.   
 
-TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE- 
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It may be argued that the ordinal information in the institutional variables is more 
meaningful than the intervals between observations.  To account for this possibility, 
Spearman rank-correlation coefficients were also calculated.  These were in most cases 
approximately the same as the Pearson coefficients.  The ICRG index for 1982 has a 
Spearman correlation coefficient of only -0.25 with ASSN7488 and -0.53 with 
REVC7488.  The differences between the Spearman and Pearson calculations are greater 
for the longer periods.  Spearman correlations with the political instability variables for 
the period 1960-88 are -0.43 for ASSN6088 and  -.65 for REVC6088.    
It is likely to be true that the longer a country's history of political violence, the 
lower its property rights indicators.  The longer period identifies those countries better 
than the shorter period, and increases somewhat the correlation between the property 
rights indicators and the political violence variables.
12
  Regardless of the period or the 
variables, however, the correlations support the contention that the ICRG index conveys 
considerable additional information about the institutional environment that is not 
captured in the political violence or Gastil variables.  The BERI index for 1972 exhibits a 
similar pattern of correlation, as Table 1 shows, although it has a substantially higher 
correlation with FREE7386, at -.76.
13
   
The extent of the complementarity can be seen by looking once again at Zambia, 
Malawi, France and Italy.   Zambia scores 20 on the ICRG index and Malawi scores 25.6.  
Malawi averaged zero revolutions and coups per year over the period 1974 - 88, and .012 
assassinations per million population per year.  Zambia averaged .07 revolutions and 
coups over the period and zero assassinations.  France and Italy have approximately the 
same scores for political violence as Zambia and Malawi, (zero revolutions and coups and 
.006 assassinations in the case of France, and .07 revolutions and coups and .043 
assassinations in the case of Italy).  However, France and Italy score 46.5 and 38.2, 
respectively, on the ICRG index, demonstrating more precisely the possibility of 
Stephen Knack and Philip Keefer 10 
breakdowns in the relationship between instability and the inadequate protection of 
property rights.   
The growth equation 
The principal motivation for searching for other institutional variables is not the 
low correlation among older and newer variables, but rather the additional insights that 
can be obtained regarding the sources of economic growth.  Barro and Sala-i-Martin 
(1992), Mankiw, Romer and Weil (MRW) (1992) and others examine the evolution of 
economic growth in countries, assuming that they are out of their steady state growth 
paths.  That is, they explicitly model growth, taking into account rate of convergence of 
countries to their steady state.  Equation (14) of MRW (1992) and equation (8) of Barro 
(1992) describe the evolution of an economy as  
(1)   ln(y(t)) = (1 - e-t) ln (y*) + e-t ln (y(0))  
where y(t) is the level of income at time t, y(0) is the initial level of income, and y* is the 
steady state level of income.  The rate of convergence is given by .  Barro and Sala-i-
Martin (1992a and b) manipulate this to construct the equation, 
(2) ln





yiT
yi(0)
  = ai - (1 - e
)(ln(yi(0)) - giT) + i 
where ai = gi  + (1 - e
)ln(yi*).  The rate of technological progress, gi, is assumed 
constant across countries.
14
  This equation is similar to that employed by Barro (1991), 
the specification that is relied upon below to compare the effects of political violence and 
the Gastil and institutional indicators on growth: 
(3) GR6085 =  + 1GDP60 + 2SEC60 + 3PRIM60 + 4GOVCONS + 
 5REVCOUP + 6ASSASS + 7PPI60DEV + i 
Here, growth is a function of initial income,
15
 secondary and primary school enrollment 
in 1960, the percent of government consumption in GDP, frequencies of revolutions and 
assassinations, and the magnitude of the deviation of the Summers and Heston investment 
deflator (U.S. = 100) from the sample mean.
16
  In the Barro model, then, the determinants 
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of the steady state of income that vary across countries are (SEC60, PRIM60, GOVCONS, 
REVCOUP, ASSASS, PPI60DEV).  
Unlike MRW (1992) and others, Barro (1991) omits rates of factor accumulation, 
implicitly assuming that they should be the same across countries except to the extent that 
education and other idiosyncratic factors drive them apart.  It is these idiosyncratic factors 
that he attempts to capture with government consumption, revolutions, price deviations, 
etc.  Although the regressions that follow employ the Barro specification, the results 
derived are robust to adding rates of factor accumulation, following MRW (1992).   
Following Barro (1991), Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992a and 1992b) MRW 
(1992) and others, we assume that the problem of omitted variables is not serious enough 
to require that ordinary least squares (OLS) be abandoned for another estimation 
procedure, such as fixed effects.
17
  This is clearly a strong assumption.  Growth depends 
on a multitude of factors, only some of which are captured by the included variables in 
any empirical investigation.  If any of these omitted variables are correlated with included 
explanatory variables, the coefficients on those included variables will be biased.  
However, there are at least three reasons for retaining the OLS procedure.   
First, the principal objective of this paper is to estimate the influence of 
institutions within the same framework that other effects, including those measured by the 
Gastil and political violence indicators, have been evaluated in the literature.  Second, the 
new variables employed in this paper are significant, even in the presence of previously 
used institutional proxies, suggesting that they are capturing some of the effects omitted 
in previous work and, therefore, are reducing the influence of omitted variable bias.  The 
third reason is eminently pragmatic:  the institutional variables are relatively stable over 
time, and would therefore drop out of a fixed effects estimation.   
Unlike Barro (1991), this paper focuses on growth over the period 1974-89 to 
mitigate the effects of possible measurement error in the ICRG and BERI indices that 
might have been introduced by evaluator bias.  The evaluators of the investor services 
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might be influenced by the level of income of the countries that they evaluate.  Current 
levels of GDP are a product of past growth, naturally.  To the extent that evaluators are 
influenced by the current level of GDP, estimates of the effect of property rights on 
growth might be biased upwards.  This is a problem that afflicts all such measures, 
including the Gastil measures.  Our choice of period reduces problems of simultaneity 
that might cloud inferences about the effect of property rights.     
Empirical Results--Growth 
The following discussion indicates that the more specific ICRG and BERI 
indicators of the security of property and contractual rights offer additional insights into 
the sources of growth, beyond those provided by the instability and Barro variables.  This 
section examines the performance of these indicators in growth equations, in which the 
ICRG index performs the best.  The performance of these variables as explanations of 
private investment is also investigated in a subsequent section.  The BERI index has the 
greatest explanatory power in those regressions. These findings are robust to changes in 
the sample period, sample size and specification.   
The regressions in Tables 2, 3 and 4 compare the performance of political 
violence and Gastil variables with ICRG82 and BERI72.  Comparisons are made on the 
basis of several regressions.  First, regressions are run with only political violence or 
Gastil variables (along with the other control variables in (3)) using the ICRG or BERI 
samples of countries.
18
  Results from these tests are compared to regressions run using 
only ICRG or BERI as institutional indicators.  Regressions are also run with the ICRG or 
BERI variables entering jointly with the political violence or Gastil variables.   
The evaluation of the ICRG and BERI indices relative to the political violence and 
Gastil indices is made in three ways.  Comparisons are made, first, of the statistical 
significance of the variables, when they enter alone and when they enter together; second, 
of their economic significance; and third, of the magnitude of the coefficient on GDP70, 
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initial income.  This coefficient reveals the extent of convergence after controlling for 
country-specific institutional, educational and other factors that affect steady state 
income.  When variables are used that capture more of these factors, the rate of 
conditional convergence, and therefore the coefficient on GDP70, should rise, provided 
that the underlying hypothesis of conditional convergence is correct. 
Equations (1) of Tables 2 and 3 are benchmark regressions for the ICRG and 
BERI samples, respectively, and include no institutional variables.  Equations (2) add the 
political violence indicators, but not the ICRG and BERI indices.  Three conclusions are 
noteworthy comparing equations (1) and (2).  First, the explanatory power of the 
regressions is substantially higher when the political violence indicators are included.
19
  
Second, the political violence indicators are only marginally significant using the BERI 
sample; the same is true for ASSAS7489 for the ICRG sample. Third, both the statistical 
significance and the magnitude of the coefficient on GDP70, from which the rate of 
convergence is derived, increases notably.
20
  Evidence for conditional convergence is 
significantly stronger when institutional determinants of steady state income are 
appropriately accounted for.   
 
-TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE- 
In equations (3) of Tables 2 and 3 the ICRG and BERI indices, respectively,  
replace the political violence indicators.  Both are more significant than the political 
violence indicators.  Moreover, the magnitude and significance of the coefficient on 
GDP70 rise dramatically.  The coefficient on GDP70 rises from -.482 with the Barro 
variables to -.692 with ICRG82.  When BERI72 replaces the political violence indicators, 
the coefficient rises from -.594 to -.694.  These results once again support the conditional 
convergence hypothesis, and suggest that ICRG82 and BERI72 better reflect the 
institutional determinants of steady state income.  Both the magnitude and statistical 
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significance of the convergence coefficient increase when these institutional variables are 
included in the estimated equation.   
In the final equations of these two tables, the political violence indicators enter 
with either ICRG82 or BERI72.  In the regression with the ICRG index, the magnitude 
and statistical significance of the violence indicators drop substantially and ICRG82 
remains significant.  BERI72 performs less well, but still exhibits at least as much 
economic and statistical significance as the political violence indicators.
21
   
 
-TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE- 
 
Comparing these variables in terms of their economic impact also reveals the 
greater explanatory power of the ICRG/BERI indices relative to the political violence 
indicators.  Since the units of the variables are not comparable, standardized estimates of 
their regression coefficients were calculated.  These denote the change in the dependent 
variable, in standard deviation units, for a one unit change in the standard deviation of the 
dependent variable.  For the ICRG case in Table 2, the sum of the standardized estimates 
of REVC7499 and ASSAS7488 in Equation (2) is -0.36.  The standardized estimate of 
ICRG82 when it replaces these two variables in Equation (3) of Table 2, however, is 
0.504:  an increase of one standard deviation in ICRG82 leads to an increase in growth 
equal to 0.504 of its standard deviation.  The standard deviation of the growth variable 
GR7489 is 2.465, indicating that an increase of one standard deviation in ICRG82 (equal 
to approximately 12 points on the 40 point scale, or the difference between the ICRG82 
scores of Honduras (15) and Costa Rica (27), or of Argentina (25) and Italy (30)) 
increases growth by more than 1.2 percentage points.  The importance of the effect of 
ICRG82 can be seen by comparing its standardized coefficient to the standardized 
coefficient on secondary education enrollment (SEC70), which is not much higher at .57.  
When ICRG82 and the political violence variables are all included in the same regression, 
Institutions and Economic Performance: Cross-Country 
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the standardized estimate of ICRG82 is 0.393 and the sum of the standardized estimates 
of the violence indicators is -0.235.  In all cases, the economic impact of ICRG82 is 
significant and greater than that of the political violence indicators.   
A similar story can be told with regard to BERI72.  Alone, the two political 
violence indicators have a combined standardized estimate of -0.47.  When it replaces 
these variables, however, the BERI index has a standardized estimate of 0.54.  When the 
three variables enter into the same regression, the combined political violence 
standardized estimate is -0.37 and the standardized estimate of BERI72 is 0.38.   
These results were robust to a number of alternative specifications.  The 
institutional variables were statistically and economically significant in growth 
regressions that included rates of factor accumulation (investment and labor force 
growth); that deleted OPEC members from the 1974-89 period regressions; that 
substituted REVC6088 and ASSAS6088 for their 1974-89 counterparts in growth 
regressions; and that employed the log of initial income.
22
   
The coefficients on the institutional variables were somewhat lower when 
investment was included.  This is to be expected; one way that insecure property rights 
hinder growth is by deterring investment, an effect that is captured by investment itself 
when it enters the regression.  However, it is noteworthy that the institutional variables 
were still significant, even in the presence of an investment term.  This suggests that 
institutions measured by the BERI and ICRG indices matter not only because secure 
property rights encourage fixed investments, but also because they encourage the efficient 
allocation of factor inputs.  In response to expropriatory threats of one kind or another, 
entrepreneurs not only reduce investment, they also invest in less specialized capital 
(human and physical), which can be moved more easily from one activity to another.  
This has static efficiency effects, but also discourages dynamic gains from innovation, 
since innovation is most likely to thrive when specialization is encouraged.   
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Table 4 summarizes parallel regression results for the index of the Gastil 
variables, FREE7386, for the period 1974 - 89.  In no case is this variable significant.
23
  
The ICRG and BERI indices are in every case significant, however.  Moreover, the 
coefficient on GDP70 shows the expected dramatic increase in magnitude when ICRG82 
and BERI72 replace FREE7386.  This again demonstrates the power of institutions, and 
the extent of additional institutional information provided by these two variables.   
 
-TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE- 
Empirical Results--Investment 
Another basis for comparing the different institutional variables is in their ability 
to explain investment.  Barro excludes investment from his growth estimations at least 
implicitly because many of the variables in the growth equation, including institutional 
variables, operate, at least in part, through factor accumulation.  The importance of  
institutions, then, can also be examined through empirical estimates of the determinants 
of investment.  Barro (1991) estimates variants of the following equation for private 
investment, for which cross country data is available beginning in the 1970's: 
(4) PINV7085 =  + 1GDP60 + 2SEC60 + 3PRIM60 + 4GOVCONS  
 + 5REV + 6ASSASS + 7PPI60DEV + 8PPI60 + i 
where PINV7085 is the average ratio of real private investment to real GDP over the 
period, equal to the ratio of real total investment over real GDP less the same ratio for 
real public investment.  The 1960 purchasing power parity investment deflator (from 
Summers and Heston) is also employed.
24
  Initial income, GDP60, enters as a proxy for 
initial capital stock. The higher the initial capital stock, the greater the effect of 
diminishing returns on investment, and the less investment that would be expected.   
As before, the ICRG and BERI indices perform substantially better than the 
political violence or Gastil variables:  their statistical and economic significance is greater 
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and the explanatory power of models that contain only the ICRG and BERI indices is 
greater than those that contain the political violence or Gastil measures.   
Table 5 summarizes the investment results comparing the political violence, 
ICRG and BERI indicators.  Contrary to the Barro (1991) results for the time period 
1960-85, Table Five indicates that for the time period 1974-89 revolutions and 
assassinations are statistically insignificant, alone or in combination with ICRG82 and 
BERI72, while the institutional indicators are statistically significant wherever they 
appear.
25
  Economically, as well, the institutional indicators offer a more powerful 
explanation of growth.  The sum of the standardized coefficients for REVC7489 and 
ASSAS7489 in regression (4) of Table 5 is -0.31.  When the BERI variable enters alone, in 
regression (5), its standardized coefficient is .815.  When the three variables enter 
together, the difference remains equally dramatic, -.08 versus .77.  The ICRG results are 
qualitatively the same, although the magnitude of the differences in absolute value is 
smaller:  -.20 versus .37 when they enter in separate equations, and -.12 versus .33 when 
they enter in the same equation.
26
 
 
-TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE- 
 
Although variable GDP70 does not attain high levels of significance, both the 
magnitude of its coefficient and its significance increase noticeably in the presence of the 
institutional  variables.  The low capital stock of countries with poor institutions does not 
attract investment, despite the possibility of high returns, while the high capital stock 
countries, benefitting from good institutions, continue to attract investment despite 
diminishing returns.  This effect is identified when relatively precise institutional 
variables are used to explain investment.   
Similar results, summarized in Table 6, were obtained when the Gastil index was 
substituted for the political violence indicators.  FREE7386, entered alone or in 
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combination with ICRG82 or BERI72, is consistently insignificant.  The institutional 
indices are statistically significant in every case, and have an economic impact (as 
measured by standardized parameters) that substantially outweighs the effect of 
FREE7386.  In combination with FREE7386, ICRG82 has a standardized coefficient 
equal to .386.  Alone, ICRG82 has a standardized coefficient of .375.  These not only 
exceed FREE7386 (.152 and .123, respectively), but are comparable in magnitude to the 
other most powerful explanatory variable, enrollment in primary education, which has 
standardized coefficient estimates uniformly in the range of .35.   
 
-TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE- 
 
The BERI variable is even more impressive, with standardized coefficient 
estimates ranging as high as .88 compared to the estimate for the Gastil variable of .34, in 
the regression where they both appear.  The BERI variable is the most statistically and 
economically significant explanatory variable in those investment equations in which it 
appears, for the sample of 38 countries for which BERI and private investment data is 
available.  Finally, once again, the coefficient on initial income, GDP70, becomes larger 
and more significant in the presence of the institutional variables, demonstrating once 
again the importance of controlling for institutions in identifying diminishing returns to 
capital.   
Conclusion 
These results offer strong support for three propositions.  First, political violence 
and the Gastil political and civil liberties indicators are insufficient proxies for the quality 
of the institutions that protect property rights.  More direct indicators are needed to 
properly account for the influence of institutions.  Second, institutions that protect 
property rights are crucial to economic growth and to investment.  Some of the 
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regressions above point to effects that rival even those of education.  Moreover, the effect 
of institutions on growth persists even after controlling for investment.  This suggests that 
the security of property rights affects not only the magnitude of investment, but also the 
efficiency with which inputs are allocated.  Third, when institutions are controlled for, 
stronger evidence emerges for conditional convergence.  The coefficients on initial 
income, from which conditional convergence or diminishing returns to capital are 
evaluated, rise in both statistical and economic significance in the presence of the ICRG 
and BERI indices of institutional quality.   
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Table 1.  Correlations between Institutional Variables 
 
 
 ICRG82 BER172 
FREE7386 -0.661 -0.761 
ASSN7488 -0.232 -0.240 
ASSN6088 -0.270 -0.319 
REVC7488 -0.424 -0.297 
REVC6088 -0.514 -0.463 
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Table 2.  Growth, Institutions and Political Violence:  ICRG 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Intercept 1.980 3.028 0.254 1.345 
 1.980 2.851 0.237 1.091 
ICRG82   0.092 0.072 
   3.420 2.499 
REVC7489  -1.630  -1.115 
  -1.904  -1.302 
ASSN7489  -3.486  -2.278 
  -1.695  -1.108 
GDP70 -0.401 -0.482 -0.692 -0.683 
 -2.564 -3.141 -4.055 -4.030 
SEC70 6.083 6.284 5.051 5.411 
 3.819 4.083 3.286 3.524 
PRIM70 -0.690 -0.959 -0.532 -0.752 
 -0.758 -1.072 -0.617 -0.862 
GCON7489 -5.222 -6.388 -4.289 -5.286 
 -1.213 -1.527 -1.051 -1.293 
PP174DEV -0.920 -0.985 -0.892 -0.941 
 -2.243 -2.482 -2.3 -2.439 
R-Square 0.198 0.270 0.291 0.318 
N 97 97 97 97 
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Table 3.  Growth, Institutions and Political Violence:  BERI 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Intercept 1.022 0.356 -0.977 -0.627 
 0.644 0.205 -0.545 -0.336 
BER172   0.376 0.263 
   2.111 1.357 
REVC7489  -1.653  -1.630 
  -1.304  -1.300 
ASSN7489  -23.015  -14.695 
  -1.710  -1.003 
GDP0 -0.501 -0.594 -0.694 -0.721 
 -2.751 -3.277 -3.520 -3.566 
SEC70 5.376 4.624 4.047 4.026 
 2.805 2.411 2.083 2.067 
PRIM70 0.653 2.793 0.580 2.018 
 0.377 1.389 0.349 0.976 
GCON7489 -1.145 -1.508 -2.968 -3.052 
 -0.183 -0.249 -0.489 -0.500 
PP174DEV -0.929 -0.894 -0.711 -0.748 
 -1.921 -1.938 -1.495 -1.595 
R-Square -0.276 0.375 0.350 0.405 
N 46 46 46 46 
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Table 4. Growth, Institutions and the Gastil Indices 
 
 
 BERI 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
BERI72 
  0.376 
2.111 
0.381 
2.067 
FREE7386  -0.042 
-0.287 
 0.018 
0.128 
GDP70 -0.501 
-2.751 
-0.527 
-2.565 
-0.694 
-3.520 
-0.686 
-3.239 
R-square 0.276 0.277 0.350 0.350 
N 46 46 46 46 
 ICRG 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
ICRG82 
  0.092 
3.420 
0.089 
3.234 
FREE7386  -0.111 
-1.152 
 -0.052 
0.563 
GDP70 -0.401 
-2.564 
-0.482 
-2.815 
-0.692 
-4.055 
-0.720 
-4.032 
R-square 0.198 0.210 0.291 0.293 
N 97 97 97 97 
Dependent variable: Average per capita GDP growth, 1974-89. 
For other control variables, see Tables 1 and 2.  Numbers in italics are t-statistics. 
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Table 5.  Investment, Institutions and Political Violence 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Intercept 0.160 0.112 0.125 0.159 0.124 0.123 
 5.188 3.443 3.404 2.678 2.487 2.174 
Institut’l var.  0.002 0.001 0.263 0.014 0.014 
  2.151 1.741 1.357 3.087 2.554 
REVC7489 -0.017   -0.014 -0.011  -0.008 
 -0.578   -0.480 -0.216  -0.174 
ASSN7489 -0.083   -0.042 -0.560  -0.118 
 -1.201   0.072 -1.346  -0.281 
GDP70 -0.0002 -0.004 -0.004 -0.002 -0.009 -0.009 
 -0.050 -1.000 -0.942 -0.461 -1.754 -1.643 
SEC70 0.019 -0.002 0.528 0.033 0.007 0.005 
 0.447 -0.044 -0.002 0.528 0.131 0.085 
PRIM70 0.065 0.071 0.067 0.090 0.026 0.037 
 2.529 3.011 2.662 1.323 0.519 0.564 
GCON7489 0.005 0.043 0.048 -0.103 -0.215 -0.204 
 0.043 0.345 0.381 -0.527 -1.221 -1.105 
PP174 -0.022 -0.019 -0.014 -0.014 -0.011 -0.011 
 -2.549 -2.325 -2.375 -1.329 -1.136 0.359 
R-Square 0.312 0.338 0.345 0.215 0.356 0.359 
N 69 69 69 38 38 38 
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Table 6. Private Investment, Institutions and the Gastil Indices 
 
 
 BERI 
(1) (2) (3) 
BERI72 
 0.014 
3.087 
0.015 
3.299 
FREE7386 0.002 
0.534 
 0.005 
1.247 
GDP70 -0.0001 
-0.019 
-0.009 
-1.754 
-0.007 
-1.233 
PPI74 -0.016 
-1.444 
-0.011 
-1.136 
-0.014 
-1.451 
R-square 0.166 0.350 0.388 
N 38 38 38 
 ICRG 
(1) (2) (3) 
ICRG82 
  0.002 
2.205 
FREE7386 0.002 
0.677 
-0.111 
-1.152 
0.002 
0.861 
GDP70 0.002 
0.396 
-0.482 
-2.815 
-0.003 
-0.685 
PPI74 -0.022 
-2.505 
 -0.021 
-2.453 
R-square 0.293 0.338 0.345 
N 69 69 69 
Dependent variable: Average private investment/GDP, 1974-89. 
For other control variables, see Table 5.  Numbers in italics are t-statistics.  
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ENDNOTES 
                                                          
1
 This chapter was originally published under the same title in Economics and Politics, 7(3), November 
1995, 207-27. It is reprinted with permission from Blackwell Publishing.  
2
 See also Olson (1982) and Weingast (1993). 
3
 Kormendi and Meguire (1985) and others assert that the Gastil indices are probably correlated with 
economic rights.  They obtain very significant results using the Gastil civil liberties index as an explanation 
of rates of investment.  We do not find the Gastil indices to be significant determinants of investment; the 
different results are likely due to their smaller sample, and to the fact that their Gastil index is from 1979, 
close to the end of their growth period, raising issues of simultaneity.   
4
 Alesina, Ozler, Roubini and Swagel (1996) find no impact of growth on a broad measure of government 
turnover, but do find a significant impact of contemporaneous growth on coups.   
5
 Researchers using the Gastil data have found evidence that causality works from growth to better scores 
on the Gastil indices, rather than the reverse.  See Bilson (1982) and Helliwell (1994).   
6
 Mody and Wheeler (1991) and Mauro (1993) use indicators from a third political risk service, Business 
International (BI), and find them to be significant determinants of foreign direct investment and investment, 
respectively.  They use BI data from the 80's, a sample which includes many fewer countries than the ICRG 
data, and a much shorter time period than the BERI data.  BI also has data from the 70's but the variables 
are different and are scored differently.  
7
 See Appendix for details on the data.   
8
 See Weingast (1993) and Keefer (1993) for a discussion of the effects of government credibility on 
investment and growth. 
9
 The predominance of trading as the object of most new entrepreneurial effort in Russia during the 
transition is likely due not only to the high returns to trading, but also to the low returns to other forms of 
economic activity that are driven down by riskiness of investments and the difficulties of making credible 
deals with corrupt government officials.   
10
 Poorer countries are likely to score lower on this measure.  The correlation coefficient for 1972 values of 
the infrastructure variable and income per capita in 1970 is .87.    
11
 For example, weighting by factor scores generated from factor analysis yields scales correlated at .99 with 
the simple additive indices for ICRG and BERI.  
12
 Barro and Lee (1993) similarly argue that political violence indicators averaged over a longer period may 
contain more information relevant to current investment decisions than do indicators averaged over more 
recent but shorter periods.   
13
 The Spearman rank correlation coefficients for the BERI data are substantially higher than the Pearson 
coefficients for the revolutions and coups variables.  BERI72 has a Spearman correlation of -.60 with 
REVC7488 and -.72 with REVC6088.   
14
 Like Barro and others, we assume that institutions do not affect g, the rate of improvement in institutions 
and technology.   
15
 Other research has employed the log of initial GDP.  The regressions reported below, employing initial 
GDP, were also run with the log of this variable.  In nearly all cases the qualitative findings, that the 
institutional variables add significant additional information that explains growth, remain unchanged (the 
exception is noted in footnote 20).   
16
 Barro (1991) uses economic growth and investment data from Summers-Heston.  For this paper, data on 
these variables comes from the World Bank and are taken from Levine and Renelt (1992). 
17
 See McMillan, Rausser and Johnson (1991), Islam (1993) and Knight, Loayza and Villanueva (1993) for 
different econometric approaches to this problem in the context of cross-country growth equations.   
18
 To fully adjust to the use of the later period, the following other control variables are used:  PPIDEV74, 
GCON7489, PRIM70, SEC70 and GDP70.  GCON7489 is from the World Bank [Levine and Renelt 
(1992)] and includes education and defense expenditures.  Government consumption in Barro (1991) does 
not include these expenditures.   
19
 The adjusted R2 ratios are low by the standards of the literature on cross country regressions because the 
sample only extends for 16 years (1974 - 1989).  Similar results, with more typical R2 ratios (in the .5 to .6 
range), are obtained when the longer period, 1960 - 89, is used.  However, by focusing on the shorter 
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period, we mitigate the causality issues that have arisen in earlier uses of the Gastil data, by Kormendi and 
Meguire (1985), Scully (1988) and others, in which growth periods beginning in 1950 or 1960 are 
examined despite the fact that the Gastil indices cover the period 1973-85.   
20
 The work of MRW (1992) and others has already indicated that human capital is a significant determinant 
of conditional convergence.   
21
 Using log of initial income and the BERI sample of countries, and including the two political violence 
indicators along with BERI72, all three variables are statistically insignificant, although BERI72 is more 
significant than ASSAS7488, and the standardized estimate of BERI72 is equal to the sum of the 
standardized estimates of the two political violence indicators.   
22
 These regressions were also run using the original Barro (1991) period of 1960-85.  The results were 
similar in all respects.  The institutional variables performed better, in terms of both statistical significance 
and economic impact, than the political violence variables.  Moreover, the coefficients on initial income 
(GDP60) exhibited the expected increase in statistical significance and magnitude when the institutional 
variables were added, suggesting once again that the institutions that protect property rights are key 
determinants of the steady state of income that conditions rates of convergence.   
23
 Helliwell (1994) finds that the Gastil variable fails to predict growth for the 1960-85 period.   
24
 Barro runs this model with and without dummy variables for Africa and Latin America.  These dummies 
remain significant even in the presence of the ICRG and BERI indices, suggesting either that our indices 
incompletely describe the institutional characteristics that distinguish countries on these continents, or that 
there are non-institutional idiosyncracies that must also be taken into account.  They might also become 
insignificant if were better able to control possible endogeneity between the institutional indices and 
growth.  Using a simultaneous equations methodology to examine the relationship of growth and political 
stability, Alesina, et al. (1996) find that these dummies are insignificant in two of their three specifications.   
25
 The ICRG/BERI variables are much weaker at predicting total investment.  This is consistent with the 
theory, however.  We would not expect public investment to be sensitive to risks of expropriation.   
26
 Regressions comparing the institutional and the political violence indicators were also run using the 
original Barro (1991) specification [regression (20) in his paper], covering investment over the period 
1970-85, but independent variables from 1960.  The results were unchanged; the ICRG and BERI variables 
were at least as significant as the political violence indicators, either in combination with them, or entered 
separately.   
